Federal tax policies, congressional voting and natural resources by Pérez Sebastián, Fidel & Raveh, Ohad
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2843610 
Federal Tax Policies, Congressional Voting, and Natural Resources
Fidel Perez-Sebastiany
University of Alicante and University of Hull
Ohad Ravehz
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
November 2018
Abstract
Can abundance of natural resources a¤ect legislatorsvoting behavior over federal tax poli-
cies? We construct a political economy model of a federalized economy with district heterogene-
ity in natural resource abundance. The model shows that representatives of natural resource rich
districts are more (less) willing to vote in favor of federal tax increases (decreases). This occurs
because resource rich districts are less responsive to federal tax changes due to the immobile
nature of their natural resources. We test the models predictions using data on roll-call votes
in the U.S. House of Representatives over the major federal tax bills initiated during the period
of 1945-2003, in conjunction with the presence of active giant oil elds in U.S. Congressional
districts. Our identication strategy rests on plausibly exogenous giant oil eld discoveries and
exploitation, and narrative-based aggregate federal tax shocks that are exogenous to individual
Congressional districts and legislators. We nd that: i) resource rich Congressional districts
are less responsive to changes in federal taxes; ii) representatives of resource rich Congressional
districts are more (less) supportive of federal tax increases (decreases), controlling for legisla-
tor, Congressional district, and state indicators. Our results indicate that resource richness is
approximately half as dominant as the main determinant, namely party a¢ liation, in driving
legislatorsvoting behavior over federal tax policies.
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1 Introduction
The question of how legislators vote over federal tax policies is central to understanding the po-
litical underpinnings of federalized economies. One may, for instance, point at party discipline.
The standard opposing views of Liberal and Conservative parties over this are oftentimes put at
the forefront of their political campaigns, and represent some of their core political agendas. The
theoretical and empirical literature on the voting behavior of elected o¢ cials points at additional
potential determinants, ranging from legislatorsideology to voter preferences, with mixed evidence
on the relative importance of each.1 In this paper we examine the role of a new potential determi-
nant: natural resources. In particular, we ask: can abundance of natural resources a¤ect legislators
voting behavior over federal tax policies? Focusing on the case of the U.S., we provide evidence
that point at an a¢ rmative answer.
One of the main scal challenges of a federal government is coping with regional heterogene-
ity.2 The latter suggests that a federal scal shock, while being uniform across the nation, yields
heterogeneous e¤ects across regions and states, as observed in various recent studies.3 Assuming
that elected o¢ cials represent the preferences of their electorate, at least to some extent, implies
that this may translate to the intra-federal political arena. Albeit being central to some of the
core issues in scal federalism, the role of regional heterogeneity in the political economy of scal
federalism received surprisingly little attention in the literature. We seek to ll this gap by focusing
on one particular heterogeneity, namely natural resource abundance.
Natural resources make a potentially important source of heterogeneity in the context of federal
tax policies because of their inherent, geographically entrenched immobility. Distortionary taxes
contract the tax base (e.g. Romer and Romer (2010), henceforth RR). However, economies that
are largely dependent on an immobile factor (i.e. abundant in natural resources) are expected to be
less responsive to changes in them because of the relative immobility of their rms. For instance,
facing tax increases, rms that operate in the oil and gas sectors face relatively greater relocation
constraints as extraction is location-specic. This, in turn, suggests that changes in federal taxes
may have di¤erential e¤ects on natural resource rich and poor regions, potentially a¤ecting the way
that their representatives vote over them.
We construct a political economy model of a federalized economy with district heterogeneity in
natural resource abundance, representing an immobile source of income. Due to the latter, rms
1See, e.g., Levitt (1996). Bender and Lott (1996), and Poole and Rosenthal (1997) provide a synthesis of the
literature, reviewed in more detail in the following section.
2Fiscal equalization, and its interaction with regional heterogeneity, is a rst-order issue in scal federalism, as
discussed repeatedly in the literature (see, e.g., Boadway and Shah (2009), and Martinez-Vazquez and Searle (2007)).
3**See, e.g., Albouy (2009), and Albouy (2012). The next section provides a more detailed review of this literature.
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that operate in districts that are rich in the immobile factor are less responsive to changes in federal
taxation. As a result, federal tax increases are relatively benecial for them, as their net scal
benets are relatively high; i.e. they get back more relative to what they pay, due to the inelastic
response. The opposite is then true when federal taxes decrease. Assuming that elected o¢ cials
act on behalf of the median voter, the model indicates that party a¢ liation, legislator ideology,
and the income level in the represented district a¤ect the voting behavior of representatives; in
addition, it also highlights the role of natural resources. The main prediction of the model is that
representatives of natural resource rich districts will tend to be more (less) supportive of federal
tax increases (decreases).
We test the models predictions using a panel of the nal votes taken in the U.S. Congress
over the major federal tax changes examined in RR. The sample period is 1945-2003, covering 50
economically impactful federal tax changes.4 We focus on RRs sample of federal tax changes due
to two main reasons. First, using narrative sources RR calculated the present value of the change
in the federal tax revenues resulting from each tax change, thus providing a measure of the sign and
magnitude of them. Second, their sample covers all the federal tax changes which received more
than incidental reference in their narrative sources, hence e¤ectively covering all the main federal-
tax related Congressional votes occurring during the given period. Given that the U.S. House
of Representatives initiates federal tax changes, highlighting its relatively dominant constitutional
role in revenue-related bills, our primary focus is on the votes taken there.5 We elaborate on the
relevant details of the House of Representatives in a separate section. Importantly, its members
represent Congressional districts, conning the main analysis to that level.
Our main treatment e¤ect provides plausibly exogenous cross-sectional and time variation in
resource abundance at the U.S. Congressional district level. In particular, we employ data from
Horn (2011) on the location and timing of giant oil eld discoveries.6 Horn (2011) denes a giant
oil eld to be one for which the estimate of ultimately recoverable oil is at least 500 million bbl of
oil or gas equivalent. As such, these oil elds provide extraordinarily large potential prots. Based
on that, in addition to the uncertainty surrounding oil exploration, we follow Arezki, Ramey, and
Sheng (2017), Lei and Michaels (2014), and Perez-Sebastian and Raveh (2016b) and regard their
discovery, development, and exploitation to be plausibly exogenous. We match their location to U.S.
Congressional districts using GIS shape-les for each Congress (the boundaries of Congressional
districts may change by Congress, as we note below). Assuming the activity of a giant oil eld
4These are described in the empirical part, and are listed, together with their relevant details, in Table A1.
5Nonetheless, we show that similar patterns are observed when examining the equivalent votes in the U.S. Senate.
6Horn (2011) provides data on the geolocation and timing of all giant oil eld discoveries from the 19th century
and throughout our sample period.
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spans, on average, over 50 years, we regard a Congressional district to be resource rich if it has at
least one active giant oil eld in its territory.7 Hence, this measure provides variation in resource
abundance across space and time. The analysis, in addition, includes a multitude of controls at the
Congressional district and legislator levels, and accounts for state indicators via state by time xed
e¤ects. We outline further characteristics of the measures included in the analysis in the empirical
part.
The empirical design examines the impact of the interaction between the present value of the
changes in the federal revenues resulting from the tax change voted on and the resource abun-
dance indicator on an outcome variable. Initially, this outcome variable is the income level at
the Congressional district level. This initial analysis tests the models underlying conjecture that
federal tax shocks yield heterogeneous e¤ects across resource abundance levels. Thereafter, in the
main analysis the outcome variable is the legislator-level vote over each of our federal tax changes,
testing the main hypothesis. The identication strategy rests on the plausible exogeneity of the
treatment e¤ect, and the exogeneity of the federal tax shocks to individual Congressional districts
and legislatores, given their aggregate nature.8
An example for the di¤erential voting patterns is presented in Figure 1, which maps the voting
results of two votes: #42 of the 82nd Congress on the Revenue Act of 1951, and #49 of the
83rd Congress on the Expiration of Excess Prots Tax. The former raised the capital gains tax,
the tax on corporate prots, and some excise taxes, having a present value change in federal tax
revenues of 5.42$ billion. The latter lowered taxes on individual and corporate income, having a
present value change in federal tax revenues of -5$ billion. The votes were taken in a similar period
(two consecutive Congresses), and yielded similar changes in federal tax revenues in absolute value.
In the rst (second) case the Yea vote share was 54% (75%) over all Congressional Districts,
and 65% (64%) when focusing on the sub-sample of Representatives coming from the resource
rich Congressional districts implying that within the latter sub-group there is relatively stronger
(weaker) support for federal tax increases (decreases). Of course, this example may simply reect
the outcome of party discipline, legislator ideology, or other economic and political indicators. We
show, however, that this pattern is observed under a more general setting, and is remarkably robust.
The results of the initial analysis indicate that federal tax changes have a weaker impact on
resource abundant Congressional districts, as pointed by the analytical setting. The results of the
main analysis illustrate that this translates to voting patterns. Specically, we nd that representa-
7Albeit we also show for robustness that results are maintained in case we assume this measure is time invariant.
8Notably, we control for the option of bill sponsorship, show that results are robust to the exclusion of Congress
members who sponsored the bill voted on, and also illustrate that results hold if only the sign of the tax change is
considered (rather than its magnitude), addressing concerns related to the measurement and usage of the present
value measure.
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tives of resource rich Congressional districts tend to be more (less) in favour of federal tax increases
(decreases), controlling for their party a¢ liation, ideology, and other characteristics, in addition to
further Congressional district and state level indicators. Importantly, we nd that this result is
robust to a large set of tests, including di¤erent resource measures, estimation techniques, speci-
cations and controls, time periods, placebo tests, and sample restrictions. In addition, di¤erent
classications of the tax changes indicate that the main e¤ects are driven primarily by tax changes
that have a long term perspective, as well as by those that a¤ect capital.
Testing additional potential mechanisms, and in particular those suggested by the model, we
nd that in addition to the main result, representatives that: (i) are Republican members; (ii) have
relatively conservative ideologies; (iii) are in an election year; (iv) represent Congressional districts
with relatively higher income  tend to be less supportive of federal tax increases. In terms of
relative magnitudes, we nd that resource richness is approximately half as dominant as the main
determinant, namely party a¢ liation, in driving legislatorsvoting patterns.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and places the
current contribution within it. Section 3 presents the model and theoretical analysis. Section 4
undertakes the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
The paper contributes to various strands of literature. First is the literature on the voting behavior
of Congress members. This vast literature identies three main determinants of voting patterns.
Several studies point at the importance of party a¢ liation; these include Besley and Case (2003),
Cox and Poole (2002), Washington (2008), Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004), Poole and Rosenthal
(1984), and Snyder and Groseclose (2000). An additional group of studies emphasizes the role of
legislatorspersonal ideology, including Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2001), Levitt (1996),
and Strattman (1995). Last is a set of studies that highlights the role of the median voter and voter
preferences, reected via economic conditions including Gerber and Lewis (2004), Go¤ and Grier
(1993), and Peltzman (1985).9 Interestingly, none of these studies focused on voting patterns related
to federal tax policies. Focusing on the latter, this paper also illustrates the signicant role of these
determinants. However, in addition it provides theoretical motivation and empirical evidence for
a new determinant, namely regional heterogeneity in natural resource abundance, supporting the
potential central role of the median voter and voter preferences in determining legislatorsvoting
9Notably, the importance of this channel may also be manifested via the other two as suggested by related studies
on the e¤ects of party a¢ liation and legislator ideology on scal outcomes (Beland and Oloomi (2017), Hill and Jones
(2017), and Potrafke (2017)).
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behavior over federal tax policies.
Also related is the literature on the political economy of scal federalism. Regional heterogeneity
stands at the heart of the intra-federal politics related to tax collections and redistribution. For
instance, several studies stress the role of intra-federal distributive politics, and their potential
link to incentives of state-level o¢ cials. These include Bracco, Lockwood, Porcelli, and Redoano
(2015), Brollo and Nannicini (2012), Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, and Tabellini (2013), Dahlberg and
Johansson (2002), Dixit and Londregan (1998), Persson and Tabellini (1996a), and Persson and
Tabellini (1996b). In addition, a related emerging strand of literature highlights the heterogeneous
impacts of federal scal policies, including Albouy (2009), Chodorow-Reich, Feiveson, Liscow, and
Woolston (2012), Clemens and Miran (2012), Hayo and Uhl (2015), Nakamura and Steinsson (2014),
Perez-Sebastian, Raveh, and Reingewertz (2016), and Suarez Serrato and Wingender (2014). This
paper studies political economy aspects of scal federalism related to regional heterogeneity that
hitherto have been overlooked, namely di¤erences in natural resource abundance. Specically, we
show that heterogeneity in natural endowments yields di¤erential e¤ects of federal tax policies
which translate to voting patterns over federal tax policies.
Last is the literature on the e¤ects of resource booms on development and economic growth.
Economists have long noticed that natural resource abundance can be a blessing as well as a curse.
This literature is surveyed by van der Ploeg (2011), Venables (2016), and more recently by Van der
Ploeg and Poelhekke (2016) who focus on the local e¤ects. Various studies point at scal policy as a
potential underlying channel (Bornhorst, Gupta, and Thornton (2009), and Gylfason (2001), among
others). A recently emerging literature studies the intra-federal scal e¤ects of natural resources,
including Caselli and Michaels (2013), James (2014), Papyrakis and Raveh (2014), Perez-Sebastian
and Raveh (2016a), and Raveh (2013). To our best knowledge, the current e¤ort is the rst to
examine aspects of the intra-federal political implications of this nexus between natural resources
and scal policies, shedding light on the more general consequences of natural riches.
3 The model
In this section we lay out a simple analytical framework to shed light on the determinants of the
voting behavior of district representatives over federal tax policies. Among these determinants, we
will pay special attention to the possible importance of the lack of mobility of natural resources.
The model predictions will help us guide the empirical analysis.
We consider a federalized country composed of D districts, with D being relatively large. There
are two perfectly competitive sectors of activity in each district: one is natural-resource based
(NRB), denoted by z; and the other one is non-natural-resource based (NNR), denoted by m. Each
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rm in NRB employes, as inputs, capital (k), natural resources (n), and one unit of labor supplied
by the rms owner; whereas each enterprise in NNR only uses capital and one unit of labor. We
suppose that, in each district, there is a population mass of size Li, and natural resources are
equally distributed among individuals that operate in the NRB sector. In particular, if district i
has a natural endowment equal to Ni and Lzi inhabitants become entrepreneurs in the z industry,
each rm in that sector employs an amount ni = Ni=Lzi of the natural input in production. We
treat sector m as the numeraire.
Capital is perfectly mobile across districts and countries and, as a consequence, the return to
capital r is taken as given from the rest of the world. People can also move, but we suppose that
they have a preference for staying in the district where they are located as long as the amount of
net prots that can be obtained is equal to or above a reservation value .10 If they decide to
migrate out of their district, migrants are allocated randomly among districts or foreign countries
that guarantee achieving at least  performing a business activity. Natural resources are fully
immobile.
The federal government imposes a corporate-tax rate  on the prots obtained by rms in order
to provide an equal amount G of the public good to each district.11 Let ri and xi be the interest
rate and prots net of taxes in sector x and district i, respectively. Openness in capital markets
and free movement of people imply that in equilibrium returns net of taxes must obey: ri = r and
i  i =(1  ).
Each entrepreneur in the NRB industry produces output with the following technology:
yzi = Azik

zin
1 
i ; (1)
where yzi is the sector zs production level in district i; Azi is a district- and sector-specic pro-
ductivity parameter; and  2 (0; 1). The return to the natural input is kept as prots by the
entrepreneur. In turn, industry m is formed by a set of heterogenous rms. More specically, rm
j in sector m produces output, ymi(j), using capital according to the following function:
ymi(j) = Amiq(j)
1 kmi(j); (2)
10This is consistent with the assumption made by Mansoorian and Myers (1993) that individuals derive a non-
pecuniary benet from living in a certain place; for example, individuals have a preference for a particular district
due to cultural or nationalistic reasons.
11This is a simplifying feature, supported by the patterns reported in Perez-Sebastian and Raveh (2016c) who show
that per capita federal expenditure levels across resource rich and poor U.S. states are similar. Importantly, this
feature suggests that there is an implicit (transfer-based) equalizing mechanism operating (which is the case in the
vast majority of federations, including the U.S. (Albouy (2009))). It implicitly assumes that changes in federal tax
rates are not systematically associated with the distribution of transfer payments across districtslevels of resource
abundance.
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where q(j) is a labor-augmenting entrepreneur-specic productivity parameter uniformly distrib-
uted between 0 and qH among the Li inhabitants of the district; as above, Ami represents sector-
and district-specic productivity. The parameters Azi and Ami may vary across districts due, for
example, to agglomeration externalities.
All markets are perfectly competitive. Firms are prot maximizers that need to decide, rst,
whether or not to emigrate to other location, second, which sector to enter, and third, the amount
of the capital input to be used in production. Working backwards, the rst order conditions that
determine the optimal amount of capital equalizes the interest rate to the marginal productivity of
capital and obtain:
kzi =
 
r
Azi
 1
1 
ni; (3)
and
kmi(j) =
 
r
Ami
 1
1 
q(j): (4)
As expected, the amount of capital demanded declines with the interest rate and increases with
productivity.
Substituting equations (3) and (4) back into (1) and (2), we can get expressions for the rms
prots net of taxes depending on the sector where it operates:
zi = (1  )(1  )
h 
r

Azi
i 1
1 
ni; (5)
and
mi(j) = (1  )(1  )
h 
r

Ami
i 1
1 
q(j): (6)
The decision of which market to enter will depend on the prots o¤ered by each of them. Since
individuals are heterogeneous in terms of their abilities, there will be a value of q call it qN such
that if q > qN the entrepreneur enters the m sector, choosing the z-sector otherwise. This value of
qN will be the one that equalizes prots in both industries. Taking into account that q follows a
uniform distribution in the population, which therefore means that Lzi = LiqN=qH , we obtain that
qNi =
"
Azi
Ami
1=(1 ) Ni
Li
qH
#1=2
: (7)
The threshold level qNi that allocates rms between the two sectors neither depends on taxes nor
on the interest rate; it is a function of the relative sectoral productivity and the stock of natural
resources per inhabitant. A larger N or a higher relative productivity in the NRB sector will raise
the value of qNi and then Lzi.
Finally, once the entrepreneur knows the sector and the amount of prots that can be achieved,
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she needs to decide whether to migrate or stay in the district. As mentioned previously, reservation
prots equal . Hence, staying requires that zi   and mi(j)  . It is easy to prove that
operating the NRB sector will always be protable for a non-empty subset of individuals. Notice
that
zi   ) (1  )(1  )
h 
r

Azi
i 1
1  Ni
Lzi
 : (8)
Since N is immobile, as Lzi goes to zero, zi will go to innity, and therefore, a strictly positive
number of people will always be willing to enter sector z.
Whether rms enter sector m, on the other hand, will depend on productivity. The inequality
mi(j)   implies that only entrepreneurs with q equal to or larger than qi will want to produce
in the NNR sector in district i; where
qi =

(1  )(1  )

r

 1
Ami
 1
1 
: (9)
If qi  qNi , entrepreneurs who do not choose the NNR sector will move to the NRB industry
and no rm will move to other locations. However, if qi > q
N
i , entrepreneurs with intermediate
productivity for whom neither sector o¤ers a return su¢ ciently large will move to other districts
or countries. In particular, an amount Li(qNi   qi )=qHi of rms and people will relocate.
Combining expressions (1) to (4) and taking into account that there are Lzi rms in the NRB
industry, gross value added (GVA) in district i (denoted Yi below) will equal:
Yi =

 (1  )
r
 
1 
8><>:A
1
1 
zi Ni +A
1
1 
mi
qHZ
maxfq ;qNg
q dq
9>=>; : (10)
Inside the curly brackets, we can see two summands. The rst one comes from the NRB sec-
tor. Importantly, its value is a function of the districts natural resource endowment Ni, and is
xed because natural resources are immobile. The second summand depends on the levels of the
entrepreneur-specic productivity parameter across rms that operate in the NNR activity. When
NNR-sector rms leave the district realizing that the ones that leave are always the ones with
lower qs the value of this second summand falls, thus reducing the districts GVA.
Let us now o¤er an example, illustrated in Figure 2, to understand more clearly how the
allocation of entrepreneurs between the two industries is carried out, and how a change in the tax
rate a¤ects the outcome. The two panels represent a double-entry chart, with the prots of NRB
and NNR in the left and right vertical axes, respectively. The horizontal axes, in turn, show the
range of values of the parameter q, which is uniformly distributed between zero and qH among
8
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entrepreneurs. By identity (5), a rms level of prots in the NRB sector is an inverse function of
the number of NRB entrepreneurs (Lzi). Given that the relatively less productive individuals are
located in the NRB activity, we can represent zi as a decreasing function of q. Conversely, from
(6), prots for a rm in the NNR sector (mi) increase with q. The locus of qN is pinned down by
the intersection of the two lines zi(Lzi) and mi(q), and the level of q is given by the value of q
that equalizes mi(q) to .
The equilibrium allocation of entrepreneurs to the two activities will depend on whether qN is
larger, equal to, or smaller than q. The left panel shows the scenario in which qN = q (notably,
the outcome would be qualitatively the same as long as qNi  qi ). It represents a district that
enjoys relatively high prots in the m or in the z sectors, due to relatively large sector-specic
productivity or natural-resource endowment. Since qNi  qi , the allocation of entrepreneurs is
determined by the intersection between the two prot lines zi and mi. Individuals with q in the
intervals (0; qN ) and [qN ; qH ] operate in sectors z and m, respectively. Thus, the whole population
is absorbed by the two industries inside the district.
The other relevant scenario occurs when qNi < q

i . This is depicted in the right panel of Figure
2. In this case there is a set of entrepreneurs that are not able to obtain their reservation prots
 and leave the district. In the NNR sector, it is clear that those rms will be the ones related
to lower values of q. In the NRB activity, any entrepreneur could, in principle, leave until the
equilibrium is restored; however, we assume, without loss of generality, that those with the largest
q are the ones that are not part of Lzi. As a consequence, the range of entrepreneurs who choose
not to operate in the district are the ones whose productivity parameter is between qz and q in
the panel.
Next, think about the impact of an increase in the federal tax rate. When  rises, the two lines
zi(Lzi) and mi(q) in Figure 2 shift down prots net of taxes fall at each level of Lzi and q,
respectively. If qNi  qi before and after the tax-rate change, all individuals will stay in the district,
and expressions (7) and (10) imply that neither qNi (because Li remains the same) nor GVA will
be a¤ected.
The outcome is di¤erent if qNi < q

i after the tax-rate variation. We can deduce this using again
the two panels in Figure 2, by considering that the left panel provides the equilibrium before the
tax change and the right panel provides the outcome after the variation. Then, before the change,
qNi = q

i and the equilibrium level of prots for each NRB rm equals the reservation one 
; for
NNR establishments, prots are equal to or larger than . When  rises, lines zi(Lzi) and mi(q)
shift down, and qNi becomes smaller than q

i . This implies that people in the z sector and in the m
sector whose productivity parameter is between qz and q will migrate to other districts or abroad.
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Consequently, this also means that Li, Lzi, and Yi will fall.12
Our next task is studying the problem faced by a district representative in Congress when voting
on a federal tax change. We suppose that the politician votes so that  gets as close as possible to
the rate that solves the following optimization problem:
max
fg
n
[(1  )Yi] + i G
o
(11)
subject to
G = (1  ) Y ; (12)
and Yi is given by (10);
where G is the amount of public goods supplied by the federal government, Y represents the average
GVA across districts, i > 0, and ;  2 (0; 1).
The objective function (11) assumes that politicians prefer bigger communities in terms of
production capacity and population size (because increasing production requires more entrepre-
neurs).13 The relative weight of the public good is given by the parameter i. This parameter is a
compound proxy of both the preferences of the median voter in district i and the personal ideology
of the elected legislator of that district;14 we suppose that districts with similar i belong to the
same political party.
Looking now at the constraints, Equation (12) says that each district receives an amount of the
public good equal to the average revenues obtained by the federal government; notice that (1 ) Y
gives average prots at the district level, where Y = (1=D)
XD
j=1
Yj . Since D is a relatively high
number, we suppose that Y is taken as given.
The rst order condition to the above maximization problem implies that
i 

(1  ) Y 
1 
= 
"
Y i
(1  )1  + (1  )
 ( @Yi=@)
Y 1 i
#
; (13)
where @Yi=@ = 0 if qNi > q

i , and @Yi=@ < 0 otherwise. The left-hand side (LHS) of expression
(13) gives the marginal benet of additional taxation, that is, the gains for the district derived from
12The function (7) indicates that the fall in Li increases qN . In principle this could potentially o¤set the increase
in q so that q  qN . Notice, however, that this will not be the case because Li declines only if q becomes larger
than qN .
13As Tiebout (1956) writes: The case of the city that is too large and tries to get rid of residents is ... di¢ cult to
imagine. No alderman in his right political mind would ever admit that the city is too big.
14We, hence, implicitly assume that any potential discrepancies between the preferences of the legislator and the
median voter, coming for instance from voters with potentially greater inuence on the legislator (e.g. campaign
contributors and interest groups) and with specic agendas regarding federal taxation, do not show systematic
di¤erences across districtslevel of resource abundance. We address some empirical aspects of this assumption in the
empirical analysis.
10
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2843610 
the increase in the supply of public goods. The right-hand side (RHS), in turn, reects the marginal
cost due to the reduction in GVA net of taxes at the district level when  rises. Looking in detail,
the RHS captures two distinct e¤ects: the rst term in the squared brackets is a consequence of
the direct increase in the tax rate (let us call it the net-of-taxes e¤ect), whereas the second term is
related to the induced reduction in Yi (the GVA e¤ect).
We can rewrite expression (13) as:
 i


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The LHS falls with  . In order to gure out how the RHS varies with  , however, we need to do
some additional algebra. Equations (10) and (9) imply that if qNi  qi and thenmax
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thus, implying that the RHS in (14) rises with  .
Therefore, a stronger preference for public goods (representing either personal ideology, or
party agenda) i.e., a higher i implies that the representative prefers a larger federal tax rate.
Interestingly, an increase in income, Yi, produces a decline in the optimal  due to the net-of-taxes
e¤ect (captured by the rst summand in the RHS of (14)). This occurs because a larger GVA
induces a higher loss in net income when the tax rate increases, thus making the desired  smaller.
In addition, when qNi  qi , the derivative @Yi=@ is di¤erent from zero, that is, the GVA e¤ect
matters. More specically, equality (15) says that an increase in the stock of natural resources
Ni reduces the negative impact of the increase of  on GVA, and consequently, raises the optimal
value of  from district is point of view; the immobility of the natural input serves to diminish the
relative importance of the exit of rms.15
We can conclude that representatives from su¢ ciently rich districts, which are not menaced
by an exit of rms, will prefer lower federal tax rates. Preferences in other districts will depend
on the relative importance of the net-of-taxes and the GVA e¤ects. If the former one dominates,
richer communities will tend to vote for lower tax rates; whereas if the latter one dominates,
representatives of richer economies will prefer a higher  . Importantly, because the level of income
Yi per se fully captures the net-of-taxes impact, whereas the GVA e¤ect is a compound of income
15Notably, this also suggests that the opposite is expected under a federal tax decrease. i.e., an increase in the
stock of natural resources reduces the positive impact of a decrease in the federal tax rate on GVA, hence decreasing
the optimal value of the federal tax rate from the districts perspective.
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and its derivative, our conjecture is that in the econometric analysis Yi should better capture the
former, and immobile inputs such as the stock of natural resources should better control for the
latter.
4 Empirical Analysis
The above model explains how natural resource rich regions may be less responsive to federal tax
changes, and how this may translate to voting patterns over federal tax policies. In this section
we provide empirical evidence in support of these properties. We do so by undertaking an analysis
of the U.S. economy that exploits cross-district variation in resource abundance to estimate the
heterogeneous e¤ects of federal tax changes on the economies of Congressional districts and the
voting patterns of their representatives in the U.S. Congress. We rst briey discuss the relevant
institutional details pertaining to the U.S. political system. Thereafter, we describe the data,
methodology, and identication strategy. Last, we present the empirical analysis and results.
4.1 Background
We adopt the case of the U.S. for several reasons. First, the U.S. is a democratic federation,
with a federal tax system that a¤ects the nation uniformly. Second, the U.S. economy provides
ample cross-sectional and time variation in resource abundance across its districts and states, as
we illustrate below. Third, the scope of the available U.S. based data enables testing the main
hypotheses using a rich data set that covers a prolonged period.
Voting over federal tax policies takes place in the U.S. Congress. The latter is divided into
two chambers, the Senate (Upper House) and the House of Representatives (Lower House). The
former is composed of two members from each state, who are voted for a 6-year period. The latter
is composed of 435 members who are voted for a 2-year period, each representing a Congressional
district. The number of such districts in each state is based on relative population sizes, and is
determined approximately every ten years; state governments may also determine their districts
boundaries continuously during the said period, so that essentially the boundaries may di¤er across
Congresses (every two years), a feature which we account for in the empirical analysis.
The two houses di¤er in various dimensions, ranging from power to prestige, with one key
di¤erence a¤ecting our empirical strategy: the House of Representatives has exclusive power to
initiate tax-imposing bills. This makes the Lower House more relevant for studying the politics of
tax-changing bills. Based on this, our focus in the main analysis is on votes taken in the Lower
House, although we show for robustness that results hold as well in the equivalent votes taken in
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the Senate. Indeed, once initiated and passed in the Lower House, the bills require a majority of
votes in the Senate, prior to being signed by the U.S. president.
4.2 Data
Focusing on the House of Representatives, our main hypothesis is that representatives of resource
rich Congressional districts tend to be more (less) supportive of federal tax increases (decreases),
due to the relatively inelastic response of their economies to changes in federal taxes. To test this
hypothesis we need exogenous variation in resource abundance across Congressional districts, a
sample of federal tax changes and their expected impact (in terms of sign and magnitude) and the
voting records over them in the Lower House, as well as additional indicators at the legislator and
Congressional district levels. Next, we discuss each of these components in more detail. Further
details are provided in the data Appendix; descriptive statistics are presented in Table A2.
4.2.1 Federal tax changes and voting data
We focus on the federal tax changes outlined in RR. In an attempt to understand the e¤ects of
tax changes on the macro economy, the latter looked into 50 signicant federal tax changes in the
period of 1945-2003.16 Using narrative sources, they calculated the present value of the change in
the federal tax revenues resulting out of the tax change, reporting it at the year in which the bill was
passed.17 These two features make the focus on their sample of tax changes particularly appealing
for our purposes. Specically, their present value derivations provide a measure of the expected
impact (sign and magnitude) of the federal tax policy at the time of the vote. Importantly, this
measure is plausibly exogenous to any specic Congressional district or legislator, given its aggregate
(federal-level) nature.18 In addition, their sample includes all the major federal tax changes that
16RR consider a federal tax change as signicantif it received more than incidental reference in their narrative
sources, and if it actually changed tax liabilities (as opposed to merely extending existing taxes). These rules capture
the economically meaningful actions throughout the given period.
17Our sample is di¤erent from theirs in two ways: i) The federal tax change they titled as Reform of Depreciation
Rulesis excluded as it was an administrative change, and hence was not voted on; ii) The federal tax change they
titled as Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and Balanced Budget Act of 1997was split to two acts, given it was based on
two separate votes. Hence, our sample also includes 50 federal tax changes, albeit excluding the abovementioned one.
The present value measure we use is di¤erent from theirs in two ways as well: i) In cases where two measures were
calculated by RR (two of the tax changes), we use their sum; using each separately does not alter results; ii) The
case of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which we split to two acts in our sample,
had two present value measures; we assign the negative (positive) one to the Taxpayer Relief (Balanced Budget) Act
based on their descriptions, outlined in RR. Further details are provided in Table A1.
18 In e¤ect, we assume that each Congressional district (legislator), on its (his/her) own, is too small to alter the
nature of federal taxation. Nonetheless, each tax bill is sponsored by a specic Congress member. We account for
this in the empirical analysis, illustrating that results are robust to controlling for a sponsorship e¤ect or to excluding
the sponsoring legislatures from the sample. In addition, we show that the main results are primarily dependent on
the sign of the tax shock, rather than its magnitude.
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occurred during the said period, mitigating selection related concerns. We exploit these features in
the empirical analysis. Last, the focus on RRs sample yields a clearer link to the existing related
literature, in which several studies similarly focused on this set of federal tax changes, including
Mertens and Ravn (2012), Mertens and Ravn (2013), Perez-Sebastian, Raveh, and Reingewertz
(2016), and Reingewertz (2018).
The details of each tax change, including the year it was enacted, and its categorization are
outlined in Table A1; further details on each of the tax changes, including their background and
purpose, are provided by RR. Figure 3 presents the annual (present value) change in federal rev-
enues. As can be seen, they provide ample variation over time which we exploit in the empirical
analysis. Specically, as indicated in Table A2, the present value measure can range from  126$
billion to around 41$ billion, with a mean of  6$ billion and a standard deviation of approximately
25$ billion, emphasizing the variation across bills. From the 50 federal tax changes that we study,
58% represent tax increases.19
To that end, we examine the nal votes in the U.S. House of Representatives over these tax
changes. These include 50 votes within the 79th to 108th Congresses (1945-2003), with one vote
corresponding to each tax change. Data for the votes are retrieved from GovTrack.20 These data
identify the vote, party a¢ liation, Congressional district, and state of each Congress member.
Figure 1 provides an example of how some of the raw data are presented for two specic votes.
These voting-related dimensions play a key part in the analysis. Party a¢ liation can be either
Democratic, Republican, or Independent. A vote can be either Yea, Nay, Present, or Not Voting.
The rst two options provide a direct meaning for the vote (in favor or against the bill). The latter
two describe abstention; Present means that the Congress member is present at the chamber but
decides not to vote, whereas Not Voting means that the Congress member is not present at the
chamber.
Due to the physical absenteeism, the case of Not Voting does not provide a direct indication
for legislatorsvotes; therefore, we exclude this option from the main sample. Notably, the fraction
of Not Voting cases is marginal (approximately 3% of total votes); in addition, their inclusion does
not alter the qualitative and quantitative insights of the empirical analysis.
19We show for robustness that results are maintained when we either focus solely on the sign of the change (rather
than the size of the present value), or exclude the votes over the bills that have extreme PV values. This indicates
that the size of RRs computed present values are not critical for the results.
20Available at: https://www.govtrack.us/
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4.2.2 Giant oil elds
Moving to the main resource measure, we employ data provided by Horn (2011) on the discovery
of giant oil elds. These data provide the geolocation of all discovered giant oil elds from the mid
19th century to recent years. Similar to Arezki, Ramey, and Sheng (2017) and Lei and Michaels
(2014), we assume that the timing of a discovery is plausibly exogenous, due to the uncertainty
surrounding oil exploration. The latter is considered uncertain because of the relatively limited
(ex-ante) knowledge of geological features of exploration locations. In addition, following Perez-
Sebastian and Raveh (2016b) we assume that once discovered, their development and exploitation
are plausibly exogenous to the institutional and economic environment. The latter assumption is
based on the denition of a giant oil eld. Specically, Horn (2011) denes a giant oil eld to
be one for which the estimate of ultimately recoverable oil is at least 500 million bbl of oil or
gas equivalent. This makes the potential prots from giant oil elds particularly signicant, thus
incentivizing their continuous operation irrespective of the particular institutional and economic
setting. These features stand at the heart of our identication strategy.
Using the geographic coordinates of the oil elds, we map the location of recently discovered,
or still active, on-shore giant oil elds across U.S. Congressional districts for each Congress in
our sample period. We do so by employing GIS shape-les of the Congressional districts of each
Congress, derived from Lewis, DeVine, Pitcher, and Martis (2013). Figure 4 maps all the on-shore
giant oil elds relevant to our period of interest across U.S. Congressional districts using the 2003
division (108th Congress), emphasizing the cross-sectional variation in giant oil elds. Assuming
that elds are active for approximately 50 years on average (as reported by Horn (2011)), this
measure also provides variation across time.21 To that end, we consider a Congressional district to
be resource rich if it has at least one active giant oil eld located in its territory.
4.2.3 Congressional district indicators
Due to our focus on votes in the House of Representatives, Congressional districts play a central
role in the analysis as they represent the regions from which representatives are elected. Therefore,
the data we examine include various indicators at the Congressional district level; namely, median
family income, total population, the share of persons aged at least 65 (population composition), the
share of persons enrolled in elementary and high schools (education), and their size in square miles.
These measures are available for our sample period (1945-2003; the 79th to 108th Congresses) with
21Nonetheless, we also show that the main results hold under a simple di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach in which
this measure is assumed to be time invariant throughout our sample period. This is further discussed in the robustness
tests sub-section.
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the exception of income and population composition that are available from the 83rd Congress
(1953). These data are retrieved from Adler (2002) and the U.S. Census Bureau.
4.2.4 Legislator indicators
Votes are undertaken by Congress members who di¤er along various dimensions. Consequently,
the analysis also includes a multitude of controls at the legislator level, on top of those related to
their district, state, and party a¢ liations provided by the voting data. First, legislator ideology. In
addition to including legislator xed e¤ects in the analysis, we follow Levitt (1996) and proxy time-
varying ideology via the annual ADA scores of each voter, which controls for year-specic behavior.
The ADA scores are constructed by the Americans for Democratic Actions (ADA) Organization
starting in 1947,22 and were adjusted by Anderson and Habel (2009) for score-ination following the
methodology of Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999). We use the adjusted scores in the analysis.23
Second, demographic information. This includes the gender, age (at the beginning of Congress),
education level (attended college or not), and occupation of the Congress member. The latter
records the Congress members last occupation prior to service in Congress, classied into seven
occupational groups that are outlined in the data Appendix. These data are retrieved from ICPSR
and McKibbin (1997) and the Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress.
Third, political indicators. These include the seniority of the Congress member, which we proxy
via the cumulative years of service in Congress (at the beginning of Congress), retrieved from the
Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress; the margin of victory of the Congress member, which
we proxy via the share of votes that the representative received in the precedent election in the
district, retrieved from Pettigrew, Owen, and Wanless (2016) (available from the 83rd Congress);
whether the Congress member sponsored the bill voted on, as indicated by the Library of the U.S.
Congress; and whether the Congress member is a¢ liated with the same party as the one that
controls the state governorship and two chambers of the state legislature, as provided by Marty
and Grossman (2016).
4.3 Methodology
Our main hypotheses refer to the heterogeneous economic and political e¤ects of changes in federal
taxation. Hence, we seek to estimate the e¤ects of the interaction of our two measures of interest,
22The ADA constructs the ADA scores as follows: each year, ADAs Legislative Committee selects 20 votes it
considers the most important during that session. ADAs National Board and/or National Executive Committee
approves those votes. Each member receives 5 points if he/she voted with ADA, and does not receive 5 points
if he/she voted against ADA or was absent. The total possible score is 100, where lower scores represent more
conservative ideologies.
23Nonetheless, results are robust to using the nominal ADA scores, taken directly from the ADA organization.
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namely the (extent and sign of) federal tax changes and the resource abundance indicator, on
voting and economic outcomes, which we do in the separate sub-sections below. Our identication
strategy rests on the plausible exogeneity of the giant oil eld discoveries and exploitation, and the
usage of aggregate changes in federal taxation that are exogenous to specic Congressional districts
or legislators. Hence, the analysis employs a panel xed-e¤ects framework. Notably, its general
structure is maintained across the di¤erent sections of the analysis; however, the denition of some
of its variables is case-specic and thus discussed separately in each case, as we further note below.
In e¤ect, we estimate various versions of the following basic model:
Oi;t = 0 + 1(R)i;t + 2(PV )t + 3[(R)i;t  (PV )t] + 4(X)i;t + i + t  s + "i;t; (16)
where O is the outcome variable, R is the outlined resource proxy, PV is the present value measure
(which is noted in Equation (16) for completeness, but is in fact absorbed by t), X is a vector
of controls, i is the cross-sectional dimension, t is the time dimension, and s denotes the state.
Therefore, i, and t are the xed e¤ects of the cross-sectional and time dimensions, and s are
state xed e¤ects. Hence, t  s are state by time xed e¤ects that capture essential time variant
state measures that range from GSP and population to federal transfers and state scal policy.
Importantly, the details and context of O, i, and t, as well as the variables included in X and the
type of xed e¤ects employed, switch between the main sections in the analysis presented below,
due to the di¤erent outcome variables examined. Hence, they are outlined separately in each case.
Due to our objective of estimating the e¤ects of federal tax changes across districtslevel of resource
abundance, our focus throughout the analysis is on the sign, magnitude, and signicance of the
coe¢ cient on our interaction term of interest, namely 3.
4.4 Initial analysis: federal taxes, oil, and income
As a rst step, we seek to test the models main underlying conjecture, namely that federal tax
shocks a¤ect resource rich and poor districts di¤erentially, such that tax increases (decreases) are
more (less) benecial for the former. Importantly, state-level evidence for the heterogeneous impact
of federal taxation across resource abundance levels are provided in a concurrent study by Perez-
Sebastian, Raveh, and Reingewertz (2016).24 The latter nd that federal tax changes have a weaker
impact on the rms, capital stock, and growth of resource abundant states. Next, we test this at
the Congressional district level via an examination of income levels. To do so, we employ a panel of
the U.S. Congressional districts (i) across the 83rd to 108th Congresses (t), to estimate variations
24More specically, Perez-Sebastian, Raveh, and Reingewertz (2016) examine the heterogeneous state scal reac-
tions to changes in federal taxation and their implications for cross-state capital movements and growth e¤ects. In
contrast to the current e¤ort, they undertake a state-level analysis, and do not consider any political aspects.
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of the following version of Equation (16):
INCi;t = 0+1(R)i;t 1+2(PV )t 1+3[(R)i;t 1(PV )t 1]+4(X)i;t 1+i+st+"i;t: (17)
In this case, the outcome variable (INC) is the median family income in a Congressional district.
X includes the Congressional district controls outlined previously, namely population (level and
composition) and education levels, in addition to a lagged value of the dependent variable. i and
s  t are district and state by Congress xed e¤ects. As noted, the latter control for time-varying
state measures, such as federal transfers to state governments, among others; in addition, they
absorb PV , which is nonetheless outlined in (17) to facilitate exposition. The remaining notation
is similar to that described in Equation (16). Consistent with related studies (e.g. RR), we examine
the treatment with a lag. As noted, our focus is on 3, which in this case provides an estimate for
the heterogeneous e¤ects of federal taxation on income, across districtslevel of resource abundance.
Results appear in Table 1. In Column 1 we examine initially the e¤ect of PV . Hence, we exclude
the resource measure, its interaction, the control vector, and the Congress related xed e¤ects
(which absorb PV ).25 The estimated 2 is not statistically signicant, yet consistent, in sign and
magnitude, with the one estimated by RR. Specically, lagged federal tax shocks are contractionary.
In terms of magnitude, accounting for the average U.S. GDP and Congressional districtsmedian
income during our sample period, the estimated 2 suggests that a 1% increase in GDP share of
federal taxes decreases the income in the average Congressional district by approximately 1:2%
(controlling for federal transfers, as noted). In Column 2 we add the resource abundance measure
together with st. Evidently, resource richness does not produce a signicant impact on districts
income.26
In Column 3 we add the interaction of PV and R. Interestingly, 3 is positive and statistically
signicant, suggesting that federal tax changes have a weaker impact on resource abundant districts,
as conjectured.27 The magnitude of this e¤ect is quite substantial. Specically, it suggests that
the contractionary e¤ects of federal taxation are weaker by almost 30% in resource rich districts.28
Notably, adding the control vector (X) in Column 4 yields a similar outcome. These patterns
25These exclusions increase the sample by a few observations compared to the remaining cases, which produce a
number of singleton observations due to the additional xed e¤ects.
26To the best of our knowledge, previous U.S.-based studies on the local impacts of resource booms did not examine
the case of Congressional districts. Similarly, however, the evidence these studies provide at the county and state
levels are jointly inconclusive (see, e.g., Allcott and Keniston (2018), and Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007), among
others).
27The sign of 3 suggests that a federal tax increase (positive PV ) has a lower negative impact on income, whereas
a federal tax decrease (negative PV ) has a lower positive impact on income.
28We note that this is a lower-bound estimate. The average median income is substantially lower in resource rich
Congressional districts (around 40% lower than the national average). Accounting for this yields a larger estimate
on the di¤erential impact of federal taxation.
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support the market based implications of the model. Next, in the main analysis, we examine its
political implications.
4.5 Main analysis: baseline results
Moving to the main analysis, we examine the determinants of voting behavior over federal tax
policies, with a special emphasis on the role of natural resource abundance. To do so, we employ the
main panel, which at the cross-section is composed of legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives
(i), and across time covers the above mentioned 50 federal tax changes (t). As noted, an observation
in this panel is a vote taken by each of the legislators, over each of the federal tax policies. In e¤ect,
we estimate various versions of the following variant of Equation (16):
Y eai;t = 0 + 1(R)i;t + 2(PV )t + 3[(R)i;t  (PV )t] + 4(X)i;t + i + t  s + "i;t; (18)
where Y ea is a Yeavote by legislator i on federal tax policy t. The vector X includes the previ-
ously outlined Congressional district and legislator indicators, namely districtsincome, population
(level and composition), and education levels, and legislatorsparty a¢ liation, age, education level,
occupation, gender, seniority level, political alignment with the state governor, victory margin,
vote sponsorship status, and ADA score. i, and t  s are legislator, and state by vote xed
e¤ects;29 as noted, the latter control for essential (time-varying) state indicators such as federal
redistribution to states, state output, and others.30 The remaining notation follows that described
under Equation (16). As noted, the coe¢ cient of interest is 3. A positive outcome would suggest
that representatives of resource rich Congressional districts are more (less) supportive of federal
tax increases (decreases).31
The baseline results appear in Table 2. Column 1 estimates the basic version of Equation (18),
without X. This enables covering the complete sample period, namely Congresses 79th to 108th.
In Column 2 X is included, limiting the sample period to Congresses 83rd to 108th. In e¤ect, both
cases estimate a linear probability model. Given the nature of the outcome variable, Columns 3
and 4 estimate similar specications under the conditional (xed-e¤ects) logistic model.
Interestingly, in all cases 3 is positive and statistically signicant, supporting the main pre-
diction of the model. Additional tests undertaken in the following sections will indicate that this
result is remarkably robust. To interpret the magnitude of the e¤ect we examine the baseline case
29Notice that legislators are district-specic, and votes are year-specic. These xed e¤ects, therefore, leave little
identifying variation to its district and year equivalents.
30For instance, federal grants to states may a¤ect voting behavior through vote-purchasing as suggested by Dahlberg
and Johansson (2002).
31Note that in the case of a federal tax decrease the present value measure is negative, hence a positive 3 implies
weaker support by representatives of resource rich districts.
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of Column 1. The magnitude of 3 suggests that a one standard deviation increase in the present
value of federal tax changes increases the probability that a representative of a resource rich Con-
gressional district will support the tax change by about 2:3%. The latter represents approximately
3:5% of the average support for federal tax changes in our sample. An examination of the role of
additional potential determinants, undertaken next, reveals that this magnitude is substantial in
relative terms. As will be evident, it is approximately half that of the key determinant, namely
party a¢ liation.
4.6 Mechanisms
The baseline analysis indicated that natural resources a¤ect representativesvoting behavior over
federal tax policies. Nonetheless, the literature, and theoretical analysis, point at additional po-
tential determinants, which we consider in this sub-section. Specically, we examine their role
in driving the voting patterns, and compare each to our key underlying channel, namely natural
resources. To do so, we undertake a heterogeneity analysis by estimating the following variant of
Equation (18) for each examined determinant:
Y eai;t = 0 + 1(R)i;t + 2(PV )t + 3[(R)i;t  (PV )t] + 4(X)i;t
+ 5(Z)i;t + 6[(Z)i;t  (PV )t] + i + t  s + "i;t; (19)
where Z is the inspected determinant. Our focus in the following estimations is on 3 and 6.
The potential underlying channels we look into pertain to either indicators related to the elected
representatives, or indicators related to the Congressional districts represented. Next, we describe
the determinants, and main results, in each group.
4.6.1 Heterogeneity analysis: legislators
We undertake a heterogeneity analysis using each of our (previously outlined) legislator indicators.
Specically, we test the following legislator characteristics, mentioning in parenthesis how each is
measured via Z in the estimated model: party a¢ liation (indicator for a¢ liation with the Re-
publican Party); ideology (ADA score); gender (indicator for being male); education (indicator for
having college education); occupation (indicator for having a recognized occupation prior to serving
in Congress); seniority (cumulative time in Congress); age (age at the beginning of the Congress);
election year (indicator for election year); margin of victory (the share of votes received in the
precedent election); political alignment (indicator for a¢ liation with the same party as the state
governor and legislature); and sponsorship (indicator for sponsoring the tax change voted on).
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Results appear in Table 3. The rst 11 columns represent estimations with each of the above
mentioned determinants, respectively; Column 12 tests a specication in which all of these de-
terminants, and their interactions, are jointly included. The key results are as follows. First, 3
maintains its sign, precision, and magnitude in all cases. The main result is, therefore, robust to
the inclusion of these additional determinants, and their interaction with the federal tax shocks.
Second, party a¢ liation, ideology, and election year, represent viable underlying channels.
Specically, the results indicate that representatives that: (i) are Republican members; (ii) have
relatively conservative ideologies; (iii) are in an election year tend to be less supportive of federal
tax increases. These results are consistent with the model, as well as with the literature.32
Last, interpreting magnitudes, party a¢ liation represents the most dominant determinant.33
The magnitude of 6 in Column 1 indicates that a one standard deviation increase in the present
value of federal tax changes decreases the probability that a representative of the Republican Party
will support the tax change by approximately 6:3%. This represents almost 10% of the average
support for federal tax changes in our sample. Comparing this to the baseline results, the extent
of the party a¢ liation e¤ect is approximately twice that of natural resource abundance.
4.6.2 Heterogeneity analysis: districts
We undertake a similar heterogeneity analysis with the (previously outlined) Congressional district
indicators. Hence, we test the following district characteristics, mentioning in parenthesis how
each is measured via Z in the estimated model: income (median family income); education (share
of persons enrolled in elementary and high schools); population (total population); population
composition (share of persons aged at least 65); and size (size in square miles).
Results appear in Table 4. The rst ve columns in the table represent an estimation using
each of the above mentioned district indicators, respectively; Column 6 estimates the case in which
all of these indicators, and their interaction terms, are jointly included. Similar to the results in
the previous analysis, we notice that 3 maintains its stability, in terms of sign, magnitude, and
statistical signicance, in all cases. Natural resource abundance remains an applicable determinant
32Consistent with the literature reviewed in Section 2, party a¢ liation and legislator ideology explain voting
patterns. However, the results relate to ndings of additional studies. For instance, Kraus, Lewis, and Douglas
(2013) nd that the extent to which governments are divided a¤ects the degree of conservatism of scal policies,
Kousser and Phillips (2012) indicate that political experience yields greater political bargaining power, and Drazen
(2001) summarizes the evidence supporting the hypothesis that politicians manipulate scal policies for electoral
purposes (referred to as the Political Budget Cycle). The role of election years, as well as (albeit being less robust)
political alignment and seniority, suggested by the heterogeneity analysis, are consistent with these patterns.
33As reviewed in Section 2, the literature is quite conclusive about the importance of party a¢ liation for explaining
voting behavior; however, it remains inconclusive about the magnitude and relative importance of it. In contrast to
these studies, we focus strictly on votes pertaining to changes in federal taxation, suggesting that party a¢ liation
takes a larger role in issues pertaining to federal scal policies.
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irrespective of the additional channels considered. In addition, the estimated 6s indicate that
income is the key district indicator explaining voting patterns. Specically, representatives of
relatively richer Congressional districts are less supportive of federal tax increases, consistent with
the theoretical analysis.34
4.7 Di¤erent measures
In this sub-section we test variations of each of the two central explanatory variables: the present
value measure, and the resource abundance proxy. Testing these additional variables serves as
initial robustness tests, but also contributes to addressing various additional econometric concerns.
Table 5 presents the results of this analysis.
4.7.1 Sign of change
Starting with the present value, to this point we used a continuous measure constructed by RR
through evaluation of narrative sources. While the sign (an increase or decrease) is a xed char-
acteristic of the tax change, the magnitude may be open to more subjective interpretation and
hence can be potentially plagued by measurement errors or lead to an endogeneity bias, despite the
tax-classication. In addition, results using the continuous measure may potentially be driven by
extreme values.35 To address that, we employ a dummy that captures the sign of the tax change,
and use it in lieu of PV in Equation (18).
Results using this binary measure of federal tax revenue changes are presented in Columns
1-2 of Table 5, which follow the benchmark specications of Columns 1-2 of Table 2, respectively.
Notably, both cases yield a precisely estimated and positive 3, similar to the benchmark cases.
Interestingly, the magnitude of the e¤ect increases substantially compared to the baseline estimates,
suggesting that the main result is primarily dependent on the sign of the federal tax change, rather
than on its size.
4.7.2 All oil elds
Moving to the resource abundance measure, our focus in the main analysis is on oil elds categorized
as giant. These, however, represent a specic sub-sample of all oil elds operated in the U.S. during
our sample period. To test the robustness of the main result to the usage of this sub-sample, we
examine the complete sample of oil elds. To do so, we exploit data on the geolocation of all
34Notably, this result is also consistent with the patterns evaluated in Albouy (2009), indicating how the observed
link between net scal benets and income may translate to corresponding voting patterns over federal tax policies.
35 In a later section we directly test for the exclusion of such extreme values of present value measures, concluding
results are not a¤ected by this exclusion.
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active oil elds (i.e. giant, and none-giant) derived from the Peace Research Institute Oslo (data
outlined in Paivi, Rod, and Thieme (2007)), to construct a resource richness indicator using the
same methodology used in the main analysis.
Therefore, as before, oil elds from this data set were matched to the corresponding Congres-
sional district using GIS shape-les of Congressional districts of each Congress, derived from Lewis,
DeVine, Pitcher, and Martis (2013). Adopting an activity span of 50 years, a Congressional district
is classied as resource rich if it has an active oil eld in its territory.
Results appear in Columns 3-4 of Table 5, which follow the specications of Columns 1-2 of the
same table, respectively, using the said resource abundance measure in lieu of R in Equation (18).
Both cases yield a 3 that is similar in its sign, magnitude, and precision to the one estimated in
the benchmark cases. Hence, albeit the adoption of giant oil elds is motivated by econometric
concerns, the main result remains applicable under a more general measure that provides greater
cross-sectional and time variation.
4.8 Federal tax divisions
The sample of federal tax changes covered in the main analysis includes tax policies of various types.
In this sub-section we look into two main divisions of the complete sample. The rst pertains to
the type of tax base primarily a¤ected by the tax change, namely capital or other tax bases. The
second relates the time perspective adopted by the tax change, namely long or short. We discuss
each case separately. The results of this analysis appear in Table 6.
4.8.1 Capital division
We divide the various federal tax changes in our sample into two groups, based on their capital-
related purpose: if a tax change relates to capital (via investment, capital gains, or corporations)
directly, it is categorized as a capital-related tax change; conversely, if it is not aimed to a¤ect the
capital tax base directly, it is categorized as a non-capital-related tax change. Note that the former
group may include tax changes that a¤ect other tax bases (i.e. labor) as well, as long as capital is
a¤ected. In e¤ect, this division methodology follows that employed in Reingewertz (2018). From
the 50 tax changes studied, (29) 21 tax changes are classied as (non-)capital-related. Table A1
outlines the type of each tax change. To further clarify exposition, Figure 5 graphs the present
value of the change in federal revenues occuring from the tax changes classied as capital-related.
We estimate the baseline specication (as per Column 1 of Table 2) under this division. Results
appear in Column 1 (capital-related group) and Column 2 (non-capital-related group) of Table 6.
The estimated 3s indicate that the main e¤ect is primarily triggered by capital-related tax changes,
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which yield an e¤ect equivalent to the baseline cases. Conversely, in the non-capital-related group,
the magnitude drops and 3 loses statistical signicance. This dichotomous pattern is consistent
with the capital-oriented focus of the analytical framework.
4.8.2 Time perspective
We examine the role of the time perspective reected in the tax changes. To do so, we exploit
a feature of RRs analysis in which they classify the federal tax changes to those representing a
long term perspective and those induced by short term motives. Notably, RR regarded the former
(latter) group of tax changes as being exogenous (endogenous) to the state of the macro economy
at the time of enactment.36 Out of the 50, 28 tax changes were categorized as imposing a long term
perspective, with the balance being classied as having a short term view.37 These classications
are outlined in Table A1. Figure 6 graphs the present value of the change in federal revenues
occuring from the tax changes classied as having a long term perspective (exogenous).
We estimate the baseline specication (as per Column 1 of Table 2) under this division, in
Columns 3 (long term tax changes) and 4 (short term tax changes) of Table 6. The results indicate
that the main e¤ect is driven by the tax changes classied as having a long term perspective. These
patterns suggest that district indicators (voter preferences) take a relatively larger role in the voting
decisions of legislators when considering tax policies driven by long term motives.
4.9 Robustness tests
Next, we take several robustness tests. Results appear in Table 7. All specications follow the
baseline one (as per Column 1 of Table 2). First, we test the specicity of our results to federal tax
policies by undertaking placebo tests using the votes that were undertaken immediately after and
before the ones examined in the main panel. As an example, our rst main vote in the panel is the
nal vote over the Revenue Act of 1945, in the 79th Congress. The equivalent placebo votes are
then the subsequent and precedent ones, in the same Congress. Doing the same for all the votes of
the main panel yields a sample of 100 placebo votes. Examining these placebo votes is appealing
for our purposes as on one hand they e¤ectively control for potential timing e¤ects (given they are
the ones voted on immediately after or before the ones examined in the main analysis), yet on the
36The motivation-categories included changes classied as: spending driven (e.g. the case of a war), countercyclical-
action driven (e.g. addressing a recession), decit driven (e.g. addressing an inherited decit from a previous
administration), and long-term-growth driven (e.g. a forward looking, growth-developing, policy). Viewing the latter
two motivations as representing longer term perspectives, tax changes classied under those two were categorized as
exogenous, with the remaining ones being referred to as endogenous.
37Two tax changes were classied as being both endogenous and exogenous; these are outlined in Table A1.
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other hand none are related to federal taxation.38 Column 1 (2) presents the estimated 3 using
the post (pre) placebo sample, indicating that there are no apparent di¤erential voting patterns
across districtslevel of resource abundance within this sample. These results suggest that the main
patterns observed are specic to federal tax policies.
Second, we exclude two groups of tax changes, and one group of states, to test their e¤ect on the
main result. First, the tax changes that pertain to oil, gas, and gasoline. Second, the tax changes
that are associated with extreme present values of changes in tax revenues. Third, the group of
states that have had a relatively small number of oil discoveries (including none). Starting with
the rst, several of the tax changes in the sample pertain directly to oil, gas, and gasoline. One
example is the Crude Oil Windfall Prot Act of 1980, which proposed an additional excise tax on
domestic crude oil. These tax changes may lead to systematically di¤erent voting behaviors across
districtslevel of resource abundance almost by construction. Hence, including these tax changes
may bias our main result. Altogether, six tax changes belong to this group (see Table A1). Column
3 undertakes the baseline estimation under their exclusion. The estimated 3 indicates that the
main result holds using the restricted sample.
Moving to the second case, namely policies with extreme PV values, some of the tax changes
lead to large changes in revenues (in either direction), as was described above and observed in
Figure 3. Since we focus on the interaction with the present value of the change, the observations
with the extreme present values may potentially trigger our main result. We partially addressed
that through the usage of a dummy for the sign of revenue change, which neutralized the magnitude
of it. Nonetheless, to further address this issue, we next exclude from the sample the three tax
changes where the present value measure is more than two standard deviations above or below the
mean. The results reported in Column 4 indicate that the main result is maintained in sign and
signicance under this exclusion.
The third case focuses on the relatively oil rich states. Such a focus enables controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity more e¢ ciently. Hence, we restrict the sample in this case to the eight
states with the highest number of oil discoveries per capita during our sample period.39 The results
that appear in Column 5 indicate that the main result is robust to this restriction.
Third, to better identify the role of natural resources in the proposed mechanism, we next
test the e¤ect of changes in the oil price. The model establishes the positive relationship between
the level of resource abundance and the strength of support in federal tax changes. Examining
variations in the real price of oil can provide both a counterfactual and evidence for the positive
38Notably, they cover a wide array of topics such as federal aid for the development of public airports, loans to the
IMF, and pay increases to the armed services.
39These states include Alaska, Colorado, Louisiana, North Dakota, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming.
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relationship, since when it decreases (increases) it contracts (expands) the resource sector, and the
change itself is plausibly exogenous given that the price is determined in international markets.
An appealing time period for testing the above is 1970-1990, divided in 1980; this period is the
only one in our sample in which the price of oil experienced a signicant increase, followed by a
signicant drop. In the rst half, 1970-1980, the real price of crude oil started at about 11$ per
barrel, and increased to 104$ in 1980, representing a steep increase. In the following years, the price
dropped down to 24$ in 1990, representing a steep decrease. The rst sub-period can, hence, test
whether support in federal tax increases intensies with increased oil price, whereas the second one
may act as a counterfactual, testing whether voting patterns di¤erentials are still observed when
di¤erences in resource abundance are decreased. Results for the two cases appear in Columns 6 and
7. The rst for the period of 1970-1980, and the second for 1980-1990. Due to the limited sample
we focus on the di¤erence in magnitudes. As can be seen, the rst case shows that the coe¢ cient of
interest is strongly positive compared to the latter case which yields an e¤ect of lower magnitude.
Indeed, it appears that when resource abundance di¤erences increase, the support for federal tax
hikes increases as well.
Fourth, we test the robustness of the main result to the usage of a time-invariant treatment.
In the main analysis the resource abundance measure has both cross-sectional and time variation
under the assumption that giant oil elds are active for approximately 50 years. To examine the
sensitivity of the results to this assumption, we eliminate the variation over time by classifying a
Congressional district to be resource rich if it had an active giant oil eld at any point during the
period documented by Horn (2011) (i.e. starting in the late 19th century). The results under this
classication, reported in Column 8, indicate that the main result remains to hold, suggesting that
it is not dependent on the time variation.
Fifth, we examine the pre-discovery periods to test whether legislators were not already voting
di¤erently even before the discovery of giant oil elds. To do so, we construct an indicator that
captures the years prior to a discovery and interact it with the present value of the federal tax
changes proposed before the discovery. Notably, the rst year is left as default category (and hence
is not captured by this indicator), to avoid collinearity. We then add this measure together with
its interaction, in addition to the R and R  PV measures, to the main specication. The results
in Column 9 suggest that there are no systematic di¤erential voting patterns in the pre-discovery
periods; however, in the post-discovery periods they remain to be clearly observed.
Sixth, we re-examine the role of bill sponsors. As noted, each of the tax bills were sponsored by
specic Congress members. The main analysis accounted for that by controlling for this directly,
and by examining interactions with the federal tax shocks. Nonetheless, we also examine the case
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in which the sponsoring members are altogether excluded from the sample. The results in Column
10 indicate that their exclusion does not a¤ect the main results.
Seventh, following Lei and Michaels (2014), we consider the potential role of oil exploration.
The latter may raise endogeneity concerns in case discoveries are an outcome of exploration e¤orts
at the Congressional district level. Notably, however, oil exploration is regulated by the federal
and state land departments, which have an exclusive mandate over issuance of exploration permits
(via, for instance, the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920), and hence are largely independent of district-
level e¤orts. Nonetheless, we account for this more directly within the analysis. Specically, we
examine the role of state-level exploration e¤orts, proxied via the number of active drilling rigs in
each state. The latter is observed via the Baker Hughes Rig Count measure, available from 1987.40
The state-level perspective is adopted given the said institutional context.41 In Column 11 we add
this measure, together with its interaction with PV . Albeit imposing a signicant restriction on
the sample size, the main result remains applicable, with the estimate on the additional interaction
term suggesting that exploration does not represent a key underlying channel.
Eighth, we test the possibility of potential systematic di¤erences in the extent of rural population
and conservative views across districtslevels of resource abundance. A rural-conservatism nexus
(see, e.g., McKee (2008)) may trigger the observed patterns to the extent that resource rich districts
are indeed rural. Notably, however, data from the U.S. Census Bureau indicate that oil rich
Congressional districts are only marginally more rural, mitigating this concern. Specically, the
average share of urban population across the districts and years in our sample (from the 83rd
Congress) is 0:761, whereas that in the districts with oil discoveries is 0:758,42 representing a
di¤erence of one tenth of a standard deviation. An operating oil eld in the district does not
preclude district residents from residing in nearby urban areas.43
This marginal di¤erence extends to more direct comparisons regarding conservative views. Em-
ploying the standard legislator-level Poole-Rosenthal DW-Nominate score (Lewis, Poole, Rosenthal,
and Boche (2017)) as a proxy for the extent of conservatism, we notice that the average of its geo-
metric mean probability estimate across the districts and years in our sample is 0:746, whereas that
in the districts with oil discoveries is 0:722;44 this points at a marginal di¤erence, which is less than
a quarter of a standard deviation. To test the role of this more formally, in Column 12 we add this
measure together with its interaction with PV . The results on the additional interaction term are
40This measure is available at Baker Hugheshomepage (www.bkge.com).
41For this reason we also cluster the standard errors at the state level in this case.
42This share is not signicantly di¤erent in pre-discovery years, standing at 0:751.
43A prominent example is Texas 26th Congressional district which had an operating giant oil eld throughout our
sample period, and yet more than 90% of its population is reported to be urban in recent years.
44Here as well this share is not signicantly di¤erent in pre-discovery years, standing at 0:74.
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similar to those observed under the former ADA case. Importantly, however, we in addition notice
that the main result is robust to this addition, suggesting that it is not driven by this potential
channel.
Last, we take two additional nal robustness tests. In the rst test we examine di¤erent xed
e¤ects and clustering options. The results are presented in a separate table in the appendix.
Specically, we test the cases in which the state by vote xed e¤ects are excluded, vote, state, and
district xed e¤ects are added separately, and vote and state xed e¤ects are added concurrently to
the main specication;45 in addition, we examine the cases of clustering the standard errors in the
baseline specication at the legislator, state, and vote levels, as well as district and vote and state
and vote (two-way clustering) levels. The results of these cases appear in Columns 1-10 of Table
A3, respectively. Evidently, the main e¤ect is robust to these alternative specications. In the
second test we examine the case of the U.S. Senate. In this case we focus on the equivalent votes
taken in the U.S. Senate. We relegate the details of this analysis to the appendix. The results,
discussed in Appendix B and presented in Table A4, suggest that the main patterns observed are
not specic to the House of Representatives, but are also a feature of the Upper House.
5 Conclusion
How do elected o¢ cials vote on federal tax policies? This question stands at the heart of the political
economy of federations, and is becoming increasingly important with the global trend to scally
decentralize. The literature on legislatorsvoting behavior emphasized the roles of party a¢ liation,
personal ideology, and voter preferences. Examining the case of federal tax changes in the U.S., this
paper presented a new determinant: natural resource abundance. A political economy model of a
federalized economy indicated that federal tax policies may have di¤erential e¤ects across districts
resource abundance levels, and that this may translate to voting patterns over them, in addition
to the standard channels of party a¢ liation, legislatorsideology, and regional income levels. The
main prediction of the model was that representatives of resource rich districts are relatively more
(less) supportive of federal tax increases (decreases).
In the empirical part we initially provided supportive evidence for the di¤erential e¤ects of fed-
eral taxation across regionsresource abundance levels. Thereafter, in the main analysis we analyzed
the nal votes in the U.S. House of Representatives over the major federal tax changes outlined
in RR. Examining the heterogeneous voting patterns, the analysis showed that controlling for leg-
islator, Congressional district, and state indicators, representatives of resource rich Congressional
45The di¤erent xed e¤ects levels produce a di¤erent number of (excluded) singleton observations, hence varying
the number of observations across cases.
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districts favor federal tax increases (decreases) more (less) strongly. Moreover, we showed that
this result is robust to various resource abundance measures, placebo tests, estimation techniques,
vote divisions, restricted samples, and time periods. In addition, evaluating potential mechanisms,
we observed that representatives that: (i) are Republican members; (ii) have more conservative
ideologies; (iii) are in an election year; (iv) represent Congressional districts with relatively higher
income tend to be less supportive of federal tax increases. Our estimates indicate that resource
richness is approximately half as dominant as the main determinant, namely party a¢ liation, in
driving legislatorsvoting patterns over federal tax policies.
The results suggested, therefore, that contrary to conventional wisdom legislatorsvoting deci-
sions over tax policies may not be primarily driven by party discipline; conversely, they emphasized
the role of voter preferences in the voting decisions of legislators. More generally, these results shed
light on the political economy of federalized and scally decentralized economies, and highlight new
perspectives related to federal equalization and its potential role within the intra-federal political
arena. We note, however, that our results are conned to the specic sample examined within the
U.S.; future research may test further tax changes in di¤erent federations, as data on these become
available.
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Appendix
A Data
The main panel consists of the nal roll-call votes (those in which the bill passed; post-amendments,
in case there were any) of each legislator in the U.S. House of Representatives over the major post
WW-II federal tax changes outlined in RR; hence, the period covered is 1945-2003 (Congresses 79th
to 108th), unless stated otherwise in specic cases. The sample corresponds to that of RR with two
di¤erences: i) The federal tax change they titled as Reform of Depreciation Rulesis excluded as
it was an administrative change, and hence was not voted on; ii) The federal tax change they titled
as Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and Balanced Budget Act of 1997was split to two acts, given
it was based on two separate votes. The list of federal tax changes included in the sample, and
their characteristics are outlined in Table A1. Further details over each of the federal tax changes
examined can be found in RR. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table A2.
Variable denitions
Votes: voting of Yeaby a Congress member (Source: Congressional Votes Database, Gov-
Track.us, available at: https://www.govtrack.us/), over the votes outlined above; cases in which
there was a voice vote are not included.
Present value: The present value of the change in federal revenues (in billion $) from a change
in the federal tax bill over it, recorded in the year the bill passed (Source: RR). In the two cases
that two di¤erent measures were calculated we use their sum; in the case of Taxpayer Relief Act
of 1997 and Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (that we split to two separate acts) which had two
measures, we assign the negative (positive) one to the Taxpayer Relief Act (Balanced Budget Act)
based on their descriptions, outlined in RR.
Sign of change: A dummy variable that receives a 1/-1/0 if the federal bill change led to a
federal tax increase/decrease/no-change (Source: RR).
Giant oil elds: A dummy variable that receives a 1if there is an active on-shore giant oil eld
(assuming activity spans over 50 years) in the Congressional district (Source: Horn (2011)). A giant
oil eld is an oil eld for which the estimate of ultimately recoverable oil is at least 500 million bbl
of oil or gas equivalent. Giant oil elds were matched to the corresponding Congressional district
using GIS shape-les of Congressional districts of each Congress (i.e. updated approximately every
two years) derived from Lewis, DeVine, Pitcher, and Martis (2013).
All oil elds: A dummy variable that receives a 1 if there is an active on-shore oil eld
(assuming activity spans over 50 years) in the Congressional district (Source: The Peace Research
Institute Oslo (PRIO); data outlined in Paivi, Rod, and Thieme (2007)). Oil elds were matched
to the corresponding Congressional district using GIS shape-les of Congressional districts of each
Congress (i.e. updated approximately every two years) derived from Lewis, DeVine, Pitcher, and
Martis (2013).
Median family income (Congressional district): The median family income in a Congressional
district, available from the 83rd Congress (Sources: Adler (2002) and U.S. Census Bureau).
Population (Congressional district): Total population in a Congressional district (Source: Adler
(2002) and U.S. Census).
Education (Congressional district): The share of persons enrolled in elementary and high schools
in the Congressional district (Source: Adler (2002) and U.S. Census Bureau).
Population composition (Congressional district): The share of persons aged at least 65 in the
Congressional district, available from the 83rd Congress (Source: Adler (2002) and U.S. Census
Bureau).
Size (Congressional district): The size of the Congressional district in square miles (Source:
Adler (2002) and U.S. Census Bureau).
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ADA score (legislator): The Adjusted ADA scores, by Congress member and year. ADA scores
are provided annually (starting in 1947) by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) organi-
zation, and are determined as follows: each year, ADAs Legislative Committee selects 20 votes it
considers the most important during that session. ADAs National Board and/or National Execu-
tive Committee approves those votes. Each member receives 5 points if he/she voted with ADA,
and does not receive 5 points if he/she voted against ADA or was absent. The total possible is
100, where a lower score represents more conservative ideologies. These scores were then adjusted
for score-ination following the methodology of Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) (Source:
Anderson and Habel (2009)).
DW-Nominate score (legislator): The Poole-Rosenthal DW-Nominate geometric mean proba-
bility estimate (Source: Lewis, Poole, Rosenthal, and Boche (2017)).
Gender (legislator): An indicator that takes the value 1 if the Congress member is male
(Source: Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress).
Party a¢ liation (legislator): An indicator that takes the value 0/1/2if the Congress member
is independent/Republican/Democratic, respectively (Source: Biographical Directory of the U.S.
Congress).
Education (legislator): A dummy variable that receives a 1if the Congress member has college
education (Source: Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress).
Occupation (legislator): An indicator that takes the value 0/1/2/3/4/5/6 if prior to service
the Congress members occupation was in one of the following categories: unknown, retired, or no
occupation / education / lawyer / professional / business / agriculture / miscellaneous, respectively.
For further details regarding the occupations included in each category see ICPSR and McKibbin
(1997) (Source: ICPSR and McKibbin (1997) and the Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress).
Seniority (legislator): The cumulative years of service in Congress, at the beginning of Congress
(Source: Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress).
Age (legislator): The age of the Congress member at the beginning of the Congress (Source:
Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress).
Election year (legislator): A dummy variable that receives a 1if it is an election year for the
U.S. House of Representatives (even-numbered years).
Margin of victory (legislator): The share of votes that the legislator received in the prece-
dent election in the district (Source: Pettigrew, Owen, and Wanless (2016)), starting in the 83rd
Congress.
Political alignment with state governor and legislature (legislator): A dummy variable that
receives a 1if the Congress member is a¢ liated with the same party as the one that controls the
state governorship and two chambers of the state legislature (Biographical Directory of the U.S.
Congress and Marty and Grossman (2016)).
Sponsor (legislator): A dummy variable that receives a 1if the Congress member sponsored
the tax change voted on (Source: The Library of the U.S. Congress).
State income share of severance taxes: State severance tax income as share of total state tax
income (Source: U.S. Census Bureau).
Rig count (state): The Baker Hughes Rig Count measure (Source: Baker Hughes at BHGE.com).
B The case of the U.S. Senate
The main analysis focused on votes held in the U.S. House of Representatives, given that it is where
reforms over federal tax changes are initiated. For robustness, we next move our focus to the U.S.
Senate, to study the voting patterns of the equivalent available votes held there, over the same tax
changes. As in the case of the Lower House, the votes considered here are as well the nal ones
(taken prior to the approval of the U.S. President). Altogether, in this case we have 47 votes in the
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sample.46 Descriptive statistics are presented in Table A5.
We estimate Equation (18), for legislator i in the U.S. Senate, federal tax policy t, and state s.
As before, the state by vote xed e¤ects control for time-varying state indicators, which are central
to this analysis given the state-level perspective taken. Results appear in Table A4. Column 1
replicates Column 1 of Table 2; the resource measure, R, is the same, only aggregated to the
state-level, given that legislators in this analysis represent states, rather than districts. Column 2
replicates Column 3 of Table 2 via the adoption of the conditional (xed-e¤ects) logistic model.
Column 3 tests a di¤erent, continuous state-level resource measure, namely states income share
from severance taxes.47 Column 4 estimates a version of Column 1 under a di¤erent clustering level
in which standard errors are clustered by state. Interestingly, in all cases 3 is positive, signicant,
and with a magnitude similar to that estimated under the baseline cases. These results suggest
that the patterns observed are not specic to the Lower House, but are also a feature of the Upper
House.
46Out of the 50 votes, 3 were done via a voice voteunder which the names of Senators and tally of votes are not
recorded.
47Severance tax is a form of state tax levied on the exploitation of natural resources.
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Table 1: Federal tax changes and income -- resource rich VS. resource poor 
Congressional districts, Congresses 83rd to 108th 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: The median family 
income in the district 
Taxes Resources Baseline Controls 
Present value (t-1) -46.04    
 (37.65)    
Resource abundance (t-1)   -31.81 -27.46 -24.01 
   (31.2) (20.6) (24.6) 
Resource abundance X Present value (t-1)    4.1** 4.15** 
     (1.4) (1.5) 
          
Congressional district fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State X Congress fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Observations 9355 9340 9340 9340 
Notes: Standard errors are robust and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** 
correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. Sample includes the U.S. Congressional districts within Congresses 
83rd to 108th.  The dependent variable is the change, from the previous Congress (t-1 to t), in the median family income 
in the Congressional district (Source: Adler (2002) and U.S. Census Bureau). ‘Resource abundance’ is a dummy variable 
that captures whether there is an active giant oil field in the district (Source: Horn (2011)). ‘Present value’ is the present 
value of the change in the federal revenues (Source: Romer and Romer (2010)). ‘Controls’ (Column 4) include district 
population, population composition, and education level (Source: Adler (2002) and U.S. Census Bureau). All regressions 
include an intercept, and the lagged value of the dependent variable in levels. All controls are in t-1. For further 
information on variables see data Appendix. 
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Table 2: Congressional voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, baseline results 
 Linear estimations Logit estimations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: A vote of 'Yea' Baseline Controls Baseline Controls 
Resource abundance X Present value 0.0017*** 0.0016*** 0.0029*** 0.0031*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.001) (0.001) 
          
Legislator fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-by-Vote fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.25 0.28 0.2 0.22 
Observations 20942 18028 20942 18028 
Notes: Standard errors are robust, clustered by Congressional district, and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** 
correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. Sample includes the available final roll-call votes of Congressmen in the U.S. House of 
Representatives over the federal bill changes analyzed in Romer and Romer (2010); sample period is Congresses 79th-108th (83rd -108th) in Columns 1 
and 3 (2 and 4). All regressions include an intercept, and the separate components of the interaction term. ‘Resource abundance’ is a dummy variable 
that captures whether there is an active giant oil field in the district (Source: Horn (2011)). ‘Present value’ is the present value of the change in the 
federal revenues (Source: Romer and Romer (2010)). ‘Controls’ (Columns 2 and 4) include i) district measures, including the population, population 
composition, median income, and education level in the district (Sources: Adler (2002) and U.S. Census Bureau); ii) legislator measures, including their 
party affiliation, age, education, occupation, gender, cumulative time in Congress, victory margin, political alignment with the governor and legislature, 
and ADA scores (Sources: Anderson and Habel (2009), Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress, ICPSR and McKibbin (1997), Marty and Grossman 
(2016), and Pettigrew et al. (2016)). Rgressions 1-2 (3-4) use OLS (Logit; reporting marginal effects). For further information on variables see data 
Appendix.  
 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2843610 
39 
 
Table 3: Congressional voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, heterogeneity analysis (legislator) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dependent variable: A vote of 'Yea' Party ADA Gender Education Occupation Seniority Age Election Margin Alignment Sponsor All 
Resource abundance X Present value 0.0019*** 0.0015*** 0.0017*** 0.0016*** 0.0018*** 0.0016*** 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 0.0016*** 0.0019*** 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Republican X Present value -0.0029***           -0.002*** 
 (0.001)           (0.0005) 
ADA X Present value    0.00004***          0.00002** 
   (0.00001)          (0.00001) 
Gender X Present value    0.0001         0.0003 
    (0.0009)         (0.0008) 
Education X Present value     -0.001*        -0.0009 
     (0.001)        (0.0007) 
Occupation X Present value      0.0014**       0.001* 
      (0.0006)       (0.0006) 
Seniority X Present value       -0.0001**      -0.00006* 
       (0.00003)      (0.00003) 
Age X Present value        -0.00001     0.00002 
        (0.00002)     (0.00002) 
Election X Present value         -0.006***    -0.009*** 
         (0.001)    (0.001) 
Margin X Present value          0.002   0.004* 
          (0.002)   (0.002) 
Alignment X Present value           -0.0015**  -0.0006 
           (0.0007)  (0.0007) 
Sponsor X Present value            -0.0006 0.0007 
             (0.003) (0.004) 
                          
Legislator fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-by-Vote fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.29 
Observations 20942 20072 20942 20942 20942 20942 20942 20942 18028 20942 20942 18028 
Notes: Standard errors are robust, clustered by Congressional district, and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. Sample includes the available final roll-call votes of Congressmen in the U.S. House of 
Representatives over the federal bill changes analyzed in Romer and Romer (2010); sample period is Congresses 79th-108th (Columns 1, 3-8, and 10-11), Congresses 80th-108th (Column 2), or Congresses 83rd-108th (Columns 9 and 12). All regressions include an intercept, and the separate 
components of the interaction terms. ‘Resource abundance’ is a dummy variable that captures whether there is an active giant oil field in the district (Source: Horn (2011)). ‘Present value’ is the present value of the change in the federal revenues (Source: Romer and Romer (2010)). 
‘Republican’ is an indicator for affiliation with the Republican Party; ‘ADA’ is the ADA score of the Congress member; ‘Gender’ is the gender of the Congress member; ‘Education’ is an indicator for whether the Congress member has college education; ‘Occupation’ is an indicator for whether 
the Congress member had a recognized occupation prior to serving in Congress; ‘Seniority’ is the cumulative time of the Congress member in Congress (at the beginning of Congress); ‘Age’ is the age of the Congress member at the beginning of the Congress; ‘Election’ is an indicator for an 
election year; ‘Margin’ is the share of votes that the legislator received in the precedent election in the district; ‘Alignment’ is an indicator for whether the Congress member is affiliated with the same party as the state governor and the one that controls the state legislature; ‘Sponsor’ is an 
indicator for whether the Congress member sponsored the tax change voted on (Sources: Anderson and Habel (2009), Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress, ICPSR and McKibbin (1997), Library of the U.S. Congress, Marty and Grossman (2016), and Pettigrew et al. (2016)). For further 
information on variables see data Appendix.  
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Table 4: Congressional voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, heterogeneity analysis (Congressional district) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable:  A vote of 'Yea' Income Education Population Composition Size All 
Resource abundance X Present value 0.0014** 0.0017*** 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0017*** 0.0014** 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Income X Present value -0.0002***     -0.0002*** 
 (0.00006)     (0.00006) 
Education X Present value    0.006    0.01 
   (0.005)    (0.01) 
Population X Present value    -0.002   -0.006* 
    (0.002)   (0.003) 
Composition X Present value     -0.0002  0.001 
     (0.005)  (0.005) 
Size X Present value      -0.00001 0.0007 
      (0.0005) (0.0006) 
              
Legislator fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-by-Vote fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.27 
Observations 18028 20942 20942 18028 20942 18028 
Notes: Standard errors are robust, clustered by Congressional district, and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. Sample includes the 
available final roll-call votes of Congressmen in the U.S. House of Representatives over the federal bill changes analyzed in Romer and Romer (2010); sample period covers Congresses 79th-108th (Columns 2, 3, and 5), or 
Congresses 83rd-108th (Columns 1, 4, and 6). All regressions include an intercept, and the separate components of the interaction terms. ‘Resource abundance’ is a dummy variable that captures whether there is an active giant 
oil field in the district (Source: Horn (2011)). ‘Present value’ is the present value of the change in the federal revenues (Source: Romer and Romer (2010)). ‘Income’ is the median family income in the Congressional district; 
‘Education’ is the share of persons enrolled in elementary and high schools in the Congressional district; ‘Population’ is total population in the Congressional district; ‘Composition’ is the share of persons aged at least 65 in the 
Congressional district; ‘Size’ is the size of the Congressional district in square miles (Sources: Adler (2002) and U.S. Census Bureau). For further information on variables see data Appendix.  
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Table 5: Congressional voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, different 
measures 
 Sign of change All oil fields 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable:  A vote of 'Yea' Baseline Controls Baseline Controls 
Resource abundance X Present value 0.036** 0.05** 0.002*** 0.002** 
  (0.018) (0.02) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
          
Legislator fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-by-Vote fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.28 
Observations 20942 18028 20942 18028 
Notes: Standard errors are robust, clustered by Congressional district, and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** 
correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. Sample includes the available final roll-call votes of Congressmen in the U.S. House of Representatives 
over the federal bill changes analyzed in Romer and Romer (2010); sample period covers Congresses 79th-108th (Columns 1, and 3), or Congresses 83rd-
108th (Columns 2, and 4). All regressions include an intercept, and the separate components of the interaction term. ‘Resource abundance’ is either a 
dummy variable that captures whether there is an active oil or gas field in the district (Columns 3-4) [Source: Paivi et al. (2007)], or a giant oil field 
(Columns 1-2) [Source: Horn (2011)]. ‘Present value’ is either a dummy variable that takes the value 1/-1/0 if the federal tax change represents a tax 
increase/decrease/no-change (Columns 1-2), or the present value of the change in the federal revenues (Columns 3-4) [Source: Romer and Romer 
(2010)]. ‘Controls’ (Columns 2 and 4) include i) district measures, including the population, population composition, median income, and education level 
in the district (Sources: Adler (2002) and U.S. Census Bureau); ii) legislator measures, including their party affiliation, age, education, occupation, gender, 
cumulative time in Congress, victory margin, political alignment with the governor and legislature, and ADA scores (Sources: Anderson and Habel (2009), 
Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress, ICPSR and McKibbin (1997), Marty and Grossman (2016), and Pettigrew et al. (2016)). For further information 
on variables see data Appendix.  
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Table 6: Congressional voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, tax divisions 
 Capital-division Time perspective 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable:  A vote of 'Yea' 
Capital-
related 
Non-
capital-
related 
Long 
term 
Short 
term 
Resource abundance X Present value 0.002* 0.0007 0.002** 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.003) 
          
Legislator fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-by-Vote fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.31 
Observations 8208 12180 11734 9623 
Notes: Standard errors are robust, clustered by Congressional district, and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 
10, 5 and 1% level of significance. Sample includes the available final roll-call votes of Congressmen in the U.S. House of Representatives over the federal bill changes 
analyzed in Romer and Romer (2010); sample period is 1945-2003 (Congresses 79th-108th). All regressions include an intercept, and the separate components of the 
interaction term. ‘Resource abundance’ is a dummy variable that captures whether there is an active giant oil field in the district (Source: Horn (2011)). ‘Present 
value’ is the present value of the change in the federal revenues (Source: Romer and Romer (2010)). Division to ‘capital-’ (Column 1) and ‘non-capital-’ (Column 2) 
related tax changes are based on the description of the tax change. If it includes changes related to capital, investment, and/or corporations, it is included in the 
former group; otherwise, it belongs to the latter. ‘Long (short) term’ (Column 3(4)) refers to the federal tax policies Romer and Romer (2010) categorized as 
exogenous (endogenous). As noted in Table A1, two tax changes belong to both groups. For further information on variables see data Appendix.  
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Table 7: Congressional voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, robustness tests 
 Placebo tests Sample restrictions Oil price Additional tests 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dependent variable:  A vote 
of 'Yea' 
Following 
votes 
Precedent 
votes 
Oil rules 
excluded 
Outliers 
excluded 
Resource 
rich states 
Testing 
1970-1980 
Testing 
1980-1990 
Time-
invariant 
resources 
Pre-trends 
Sponsors 
excluded 
Exploration 
DW-
Nominate 
Resource abundance X 
Present value 
0.0005 0.0008 0.0014** 0.0017** 0.0017*** 0.0023 0.0006 0.0018*** 0.0019*** 0.0017*** 0.002* 0.0014** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.001) (0.0006) 
Pre-discovery X Present 
value 
             0.0006    
              (0.0006)    
Rig X Present value                0.00001  
                (0.00001)  
DW X Present value                 -0.02*** 
                 (0.003) 
                          
Legislator fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-by-Vote fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.31 0.22 0.26 0.23 0.29 0.27 0.17 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.4 0.26 
Observations 20942 20942 17917 19685 2224 4189 2500 20942 20942 20891 3197 20942 
Notes: Standard errors are robust, clustered by Congressional district (by state in Column 11) and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. The 
general sample includes the available final roll-call votes of Congressmen in the U.S. House of Representatives over the federal bill changes analyzed in Romer and Romer (2010) and sample period is 1945-2003 (Congresses 
79th-108th). In Column 3 oil-related votes are excluded; in Column 4 votes involving extreme values of tax revenue changes are excluded; in Column 5 the sample is restricted to the 8 states with the highest number of oil 
discoveries per capita (namely, AK, CO, LA, ND, NM, OK, TX, and WY); in Column 6 (7) the sample is restricted to 1970-1980 (1980-1990); in Column 10 votes of sponsoring representatives are excluded (Source: Library of the 
U.S. Congress); in Column 1 (2) the sample includes the votes that were the next (prior) voted on after (before) the ones examined in the main sample; in Column 9 ‘Pre-discovery’ is a dummy variable that captures the periods 
prior to the discovery, with the exception of the initial year. All regressions include an intercept, and the separate components of the interaction term. ‘Resource abundance’ is a dummy variable that captures whether there is 
an active giant oil field in the district (Columns 1-7, and 9-12), or whether there was an active giant oil field in the district throughout the sample period (Column 8) [Source: Horn (2011)]. ‘Present value’ is the present value of 
the change in the federal revenues (Source: Romer and Romer (2010)). ‘Rig’ is the Baker Hughes Rig Count (Source: Baker Hughes at BHGE.com). ‘DW’ is the Poole-Rosenthal DW-Nominate Index (Source: Lewis et al. (2017)). 
For further information on variables see data Appendix.  
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Table A1: Federal tax Changes and Congressional Voting 
Title 
Exogenous (EX) 
/Endogenous (EN) 
Capital-related 
(CR) / Non-
capital-related 
(NCR) 
Related 
directly to oil 
and gas 
Year (Congress) Title 
Exogenous (EX) 
/Endogenous (EN) 
Capital-related 
(CR) / Non-
capital-related 
(NCR) 
Related 
directly to 
oil and gas 
Year (Congress) 
Revenue Act of 1945 EN CR   1945 (79) Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 EN CR   1968 (90) 
Social Security Amendments of 1947 EX  NCR   1948 (80) Tax Reform Act of 1969 EN and EX CR   1969 (91) 
Revenue Act of 1948 EX NCR   1948 (80) 1971 Changes to Social Security EN NCR   1971 (92) 
Social Security Amendments of 1950 EN NCR   1949 (81) Revenue Act of 1971 EX  CR   1971 (92) 
Revenue Act of 1950 EN CR   1950 (81) 1972 Changes to Social Security EN   NCR   1971 (92) 
Excess Profits Tax Act of 1950  EN CR   1950 (81) 1973 Changes to Social Security EN  NCR   1973 (93) 
Revenue Act of 1951 EN CR   1951 (82) Tax Reduction Act of 1975 EN NCR   1975 (94) 
Expiration of Excess Profits Tax and of Temporary 
Income Tax Increases 
EN CR   1953 (82) Tax Reform Act of 1976 EX NCR   1975 (94) 
Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1954 EN NCR   1954 (83) Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977 EX NCR   1977 (95) 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 EX CR   1954 (83) Social Security Amendments of 1977 EX NCR   1977 (95) 
Social Security Amendments of 1954 EN CR    1954 (83) Revenue Act of 1978 EX CR   1978 (95) 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 EN NCR Yes 1956 (84) Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980 EX CR Yes 1979 (96) 
Social Security Amendments of 1956 EN NCR   1955 (84) Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 EX CR   1981 (97) 
Tax Rate Extension Act of 1958 EX NCR Yes 1958 (85) 
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 
1982 
EX CR   1982 (97) 
Social Security Amendments of 1958 EN NCR   1958 (85) Social Security Amendments of 1983 EX NCR   1983 (98) 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1959 EX NCR Yes 1959 (86) Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 EX NCR   1984 (98) 
Social Security Amendments of 1961 EN NCR   1961 (87) Tax Reform Act of 1986 EX CR   1985 (99) 
Changes in Depreciation Guidelines and Revenue 
Act of 1962 
EX CR   1962 (87) Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 EX NCR   1987 (100) 
Revenue Act of 1964 EX CR   1963 (88) Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 EX NCR Yes 1990 (101) 
Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965 EX NCR   1965 (89) Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 EX NCR Yes 1993 (103) 
Social Security Amendments of 1965 EN NCR   1965 (89) Balanced Budget Act of 1997 EX NCR   1997 (105) 
Tax Adjustment Act of 1966 EX NCR   1966 (89) Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 EN CR   1997 (105) 
Public Law 89-800 (Suspension of Investment Tax 
Credit) 
EN CR   1966 (89) 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001 
EN and EX NCR   2001 (107) 
Public Law 90-26 (Restoration of the Investment 
Tax Credit) 
EX CR   1967 (90) 
Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 
2002 
EN CR   2002 (107) 
Social Security Amendments of 1967 EN NCR   1967 (90) 
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 
of 2003 
EX CR   2003 (108) 
Notes: The table lists the 50 major federal tax changes, 1945-2003, from Romer and Romer (2010), with two modifications: i) The federal tax change they titled as ‘Reform of Depreciation Rules’ is excluded as it was an administrative change, and hence was not voted on; ii) The 
federal tax change they titled as ‘Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and Balanced Budget Act of 1997’ was split to two acts, given it was based on two separate votes. ‘Exogenous/Endogenous’ refers to the type of classification the federal tax change was given by Romer and Romer 
(2010). ‘Capital-related/Non-capital-related’ refers to whether the federal tax change is related to capital or not. In case the tax change directly affects capital, investment, and/or corporations it is classified as capital-related; otherwise, it is categorized as non-capital-related. 
‘Related directly to oil and gas’ refers to whether the tax change is directly related to taxing oil, gas, or gasoline. The corresponding votes are the final ones (those in which the bill passed; post-amendments, in case there were any) over each of the bills. Votes recorded as ‘Voice 
vote’ are excluded from the sample as they do not record the names of Senators and tally of votes. For further information on these federal tax changes see Romer and Romer (2010).  
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics, votes of House of Representatives and Congressional districts 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Aye Vote 0.69 0.46 0 1 
Resource abundance 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Present value (billion $) -7.001 26.09 -125.9 41.64 
Median family income (Congressional district, thousand $) 10.09 7.05 7.88 78.88 
Population (Congressional district) 428745.2 142832 155343 7700000 
Education (Congressional district) 0.23 0.06 0.09 0.29 
Population composition (Congressional district) 0.11 0.04 0.008 0.44 
Size (Congressional district) 11136.8 10965.96 30 64199.02 
Sign of change 0.37 0.93 -1 1 
Republican (legislator) 0.43 0.49 0 1 
ADA score (legislator) 55.31 34.60 0 100 
Gender (legislator) 0.97 0.16 0 1 
Education (legislator) 0.93 0.25 0 1 
Occupation (legislator) 2.52 1.32 0 6 
Seniority (legislator) 8.36 7.21 0 51.17 
Age (legislator) 51.74 9.72 26 88 
Margin of victory (legislator) 0.76 0.13 0.17 1 
Political alignment with state governor (legislator) 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Rig count 36.74 94.19 0 462 
DW-Nominate score 0.75 0.08 0.29 0.96 
Notes: For detailed description of variables see Appendix. 
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Table A3: Congressional voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, different specifications 
 Different fixed effects Different clustering 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent variable: A vote of 'Yea' Legislator District State Vote State-vote Legislator State Vote 
District-
vote 
State-
vote 
Resource abundance X Present value 0.0028*** 0.0026*** 0.0026*** 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0017** 0.0017** 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 0.0017** 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
                      
Legislator fixed effects Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State / State-by-Vote fixed effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Vote fixed effects No No No Yes Yes No No No No No 
District fixed effects No Yes No No No No No No No No 
State fixed effects No No Yes No Yes No No No No No 
             
R-squared 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.13 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Observations 21360 21617 21190 21648 21190 20942 20942 20942 20942 20942 
Notes: Standard errors are robust, clustered by Congressional district (Columns 1-5), legislator (Column 6), state (Column 7), vote (Column 8), district and vote (Column 9), and state and vote (Column 10) and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** 
correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. Sample includes the available final roll-call votes of Congressmen in the U.S. House of Representatives over the federal bill changes analyzed in Romer and Romer (2010); sample period is Congresses 79th-108th. All regressions include 
an intercept, and the separate components of the interaction term. ‘Resource abundance’ is a dummy variable that captures whether there is an active giant oil field in the district (Source: Horn (2011)). ‘Present value’ is the present value of the change in the federal revenues (Source: 
Romer and Romer (2010)). For further information on variables see data Appendix.  
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Table A4: Congressional voting in the U.S. Senate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable:  A vote of 'Yea' Baseline Logit 
Continuous 
measure 
State-
level 
clustering 
Resource abundance X Present value 0.0021*** 0.001** 0.0036** 0.002** 
  (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.002) (0.001) 
          
Legislator fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State X Vote fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.13 
Observations 4618 4618 4618 4618 
Notes: Standard errors are robust, clustered by legislator and vote (by state in Column 4), and appear in parentheses for independent variables. 
Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. Sample includes the available final roll-call votes of Congressmen in the U.S. 
Senate over the federal bill changes analyzed in Romer and Romer (2010); sample period is 1945-2003 (Congresses 79th-108th). All regressions include 
an intercept, and the separate components of the interaction term. ‘Resource abundance’ is either a dummy variable that captures whether there is an 
active giant oil field in the state (Columns 1, 2, 4) [Source: Horn (2011)], or the income share of severance taxes (Column 3) [Source: U.S. Census]. 
‘Present value’ is the present value of the change in the federal revenues (Source: Romer and Romer (2010)). All regressions use OLS, with the 
exception of Column 2 that uses Logit (reporting marginal effects). For further information on variables see data Appendix.  
 
 
Table A5: Descriptive Statistics, votes of Senate 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Aye Vote 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Present value -3.56 27.13 -125.9 41.64 
Resource abundance  0.25 0.43 0 1 
Income share of severance taxes 0.03 0.08 0 0.75 
Notes: For detailed description of variables see Appendix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2843610 
48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2843610 
49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2843610 
50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2843610 
51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2843610 
52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2843610 
53 
 
 
 
 
